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DELAYING THE INEVITABLE: A COMPEL-ING TALE OF THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT AND A PESTICIDE 
 
In re Pesticide Action Network N. Am., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 798 
F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2015) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes a 
Court to compel agency action that has been unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed.1 The standard with which agencies are deemed to 
have unlawfully withheld action has been directly addressed by the 
Supreme Court and it is a fairly bright line.2 However, the standard to 
determine an agency’s unreasonable delay is not nearly as clear.3 Congress 
granted, and the Supreme Court held, that federal agencies such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency are to be provided broad discretionary 
authority when determining how and when they will implement rules or 
regulations.4 This poses problems for petitioners challenging the EPA’s 
                                                 
1 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012). 
2 See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 62-65 (2004). 
3 E. Hammond & D. L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building 
Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 338 (2013). 
4 Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007). 
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stance on certain issues, particularly when there is no clear deadline the 
EPA must adhere to.5 In re Pesticide Action Network N. Am., Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc. directly addresses the standard of unreasonable delay in 
this context.6 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
In September 2007, Pesticide Action Network North America and 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (“PANNA”), the petitioners, 
filed an administrative petition with the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”), the respondents, in order to get the EPA to remove chlorpyrifos 
from the list of registered safe pesticides.7 PANNA’s petition was in 
response to the EPA’s evaluation of chorpyrifos following the required 
review of all “registered pesticides” according to the Food Quality 
Protection Act of 1996.8 The EPA determined that although the pesticide 
was not safe for residential use, its use was still permissible in agricultural 
                                                 
5 See Beyond Pesticides/Nat'l Coal. Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Johnson, 407 F. 
Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2005). 
6 In re Pesticide Action Network N.A., Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 798 F.3d 809, 
813 (9th Cir. 2015) (hereinafter “Pesticide Action Network”). 
7 Id. at 812.  
8 Id. at 811. (“The Act gave EPA ten years to complete an initial review of registered 
pesticides, 21 U.S.C. 346a(q)(1), and ordered the agency to repeat the process using 
updated scientific data every fifteen years, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(g)(1)(A)(iii).”).  
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areas.9 PANNA disagreed, and thus, it filed the administrative petition, to 
which the Court determined EPA’s only response was to publish notice in 
the Federal Register.10 
After not receiving any satisfactory ruling or response from the 
EPA, PANNA filed suit “demanding a final response to the administrative 
petition.”11 Although the lawsuit was never tried, an agreement was struck 
where the EPA was to “issue a human risk assessment by June 2011 and a 
final response by November 2011.”12 Ultimately, the human risk 
assessment was issued in July 2011, a month past the agreed upon 
deadline, and the “final response” was never issued.13 This prior 
agreement and lack of response from the EPA again led PANNA to seek 
judicial relief, and it filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in April 
2012.14 
In its argument to the Ninth Circuit, the EPA, along with partially 
denying PANNA’s petition, set forth what the Ninth Circuit considered a 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 812. (“EPA published a notice of that petition in the Federal Register, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 58,845 (Oct. 17, 2007), but otherwise did not issue any formal response to it.”). 
11 Id. (Suit was filed in the Federal District of New York). 
12 Id. (Stipulation and Order, N.R.D.C. v. EPA, No. 10–CV–05590 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 
2010), ECF No. 17). 
13 Id. 
14 Id.  
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“concrete timeline” as to when and how it would respond to the remaining 
undecided issues raised by the petition.15 The Ninth Circuit denied relief to 
PANNA, specifically noting the EPA’s timeline as a leading factor in its 
holding.16  
The last potential deadline date that the EPA said it would have 
issued a response was February 2014, after the EPA again failed to adhere 
to its own agreed-upon deadlines, PANNA renewed its writ of mandamus 
with the Ninth Circuit.17 The court held that the when the EPA continued 
to delay and issue unsatisfactory, incomplete responses at the risk of the 
public health, mandamus relief was appropriate.18 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Chlorpyrifos and the Food Quality Act of 1996 
Chlorpyrifos became a registered organophosphate pesticide in 
1965.19 Its primary purpose is to control foliage and soil-borne insect pests 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 813.  
19 US Environmental Protection Agency Office of Pesticide Programs (hereafter “OPP”), 
Reregistration Eligibility Decision for Chlorpyrifos, viii  
http://www3.epa.gov/pesticides/chem_search/reg_actions/reregistration/red_PC-
059101_1-Jul-06.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
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on food and feed crops.20 The EPA is tasked with the responsibility for 
registering and monitoring pesticides, including chlorpyrifos.21 The EPA 
reports that the current primary application of chlorpyrifos is for the 
agricultural production of corn.22 However, chlorpyrifos is also used with 
other agricultural products such as soybeans, fruit trees, cranberries and 
other citrus crops, along with nonagricultural uses such as golf course 
protection, turf applications, and wood treatment.23 Chlorpyrifos is sold in 
numerous forms including liquids, granulars and flowable concentrates, 
and it can be applied using both ground and aerial equipment.24 
Approximately 10 million pounds of chlorpyrifos are used in the 
agricultural industry every year.25 As of 2000, there were six “technical 
registrants” using chlorpyrifos including Dow AgroSciences, Cheminova, 
Inc., Gharda USA, Inc., Luxembourg-Pamol, Inc., Makhteshim-Agan of 
                                                 
20 U.S. Envt’l Protection Agency (hereinafter “EPA”), Chlorpyrfios. 
http://www2.epa.gov/ingredients-used-pesticide-products/chlorpyrifos (last visited Nov. 
22, 2015). 
21 Pesticide Action Network, 798 F.3d at 811 (9th Cir. 2015). 
22 EPA, Basic Information, http://www2.epa.gov/ingredients-used-pesticide-
products/chlorpyrifos (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
25 EPA, Chlorpyrifos Facts. Uses, 
http://www3.epa.gov/pesticides/chem_search/reg_actions/reregistration/red_PC-
059101_1-Jul-06.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
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North America, Inc. and Platte Chemical Company, Inc.26 At one point 
chlorpyrifos was estimated to have been in over 400 registered products.27 
On August 3, 1996, President Clinton signed the Food Quality 
Protection Act (“FQPA”) into law.28 The FQPA amended two acts directly 
affecting chlorpyrifos regulation, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) and the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(“FFDCA”).29 A consequence resulting from the passage of the FQPA was 
that it “fundamentally changed [the] EPA’s regulation of pesticides.”30 
One purpose of the FQPA was to change the way in which pesticides 
chemical tolerances were evaluated to “better reflect real-world 
situations.”31 Not only did the FQPA effect the registration of new 
pesticides under FIFRA, it also required reassessment of currently 
registered pesticides under the both FIFRA and FFDCA.32 
                                                 
26 EPA, Executive Summary, 
http://www3.epa.gov/pesticides/chem_search/reg_actions/reregistration/red_PC-
059101_1-Jul-06.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
27 EPA, Regulatory History, 
http://www3.epa.gov/pesticides/chem_search/reg_actions/reregistration/red_PC-
059101_1-Jul-06.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
28 EPA, Summary of the Food Quality Protection Act., http://www2.epa.gov/laws-






The FFDCA amendment required the EPA to reassess currently 
registered pesticides tolerances, including chlorpyrifos.33 In order for a 
currently registered pesticide to be eligible for reregistration at an 
unchanged tolerance, it must satisfy the new safety standard.34 Section 
346a(b)(2) states that the EPA can leave a tolerance of a currently 
registered pesticide unchanged only if it determines the pesticide’s 
chemical residue tolerance to be “safe.”35 A pesticide’s chemical residue 
tolerance is considered to be “safe” according to FQPA if the EPA 
administrator’s reevaluation “determines that there is a reasonable 
certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide 
chemical residue.”36  
The FQPA also set forth a mandatory timeframe where all 
currently registered pesticides must be reassessed.37 Section 346a(j)(3) 
required the EPA to reassess current “tolerances and exemptions” of 
pesticides on the following timeframe provided in §346a(q)(1): “(A) 33 
                                                 
33 In re Pesticide Action Network N. Am., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 798 F.3d 809, 
811 (9th Cir. 2015). 
34 EPA, Summary of the Food Quality Protection Act, http://www2.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/summary-food-quality-protection-act (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
35 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
36 § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
37 § 346a(q). 
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percent of tolerances and exemptions within 3 years of August 3, 1996”; 
(B) 66 percent within 6 years; and (C) 100 percent within 10 years.38 
FIFRA requires reassessment of registered pesticides every fifteen years.39 
During the mandatory review phase the EPA took several actions 
limiting the use of chlorpyrifos.40 According to the EPA, excessive 
exposure to chlorpyrifos  has been found to cause cholinesterase inhibition 
which can lead to nervous system malfunction and even death and 
“occupational exposure is of concern.”41 From 2000 to 2002, the EPA 
banned all household uses of chlorpyrifos (with a few exemptions) and 
limited its use on certain crops.42 On September 25, 2009 the EPA 
published a final work plan relating to chlorpyrifos.43 This work plan also 
addressed PANNA’s petition (this is the petition in dispute under In re 
Pesticide) stating it intended to keep its planned reregistration review 
                                                 
38  §§ 346a(j)(3), 346a(q)(1)(A)-(C). 
39 7 U.S.C. §136a(g) (2012). 
40 EPA, Chlorpyrifos, http://www2.epa.gov/ingredients-used-pesticide-
products/chlorpyrifos. 
41 Id. 
42 Id.  
43 See generally EPA, Chlorpyrifos Final Work Plan, 
http://www.chlorpyrifos.com/regulatory/chlorpyrifos-schedule.htm (follow “Final Work 
Plan” hyperlink). 
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under FIFRA in place.44 In 2012 chlorpyrifos use was further limited with 
regulation by “lowering application rates” and “creating ‘no-spray’ zones” 
around certain public spaces.45 Currently chlorpyrifos is being reassessed 
under the fifteen-year review process.46 
In addition to the statutorily required review processes, the FFDCA 
authorizes any person to petition the EPA in order to establish, modify, or 
revoke a current tolerance or exemption regarding currently registered 
pesticide chemical residue tolerances.47 Section 346a(d)(2) sets forth the 
requirements each petition must meet.48 If the EPA receives a complete 
petition it must publish notice of the petition’s proposal complete with a 
summary within 30 days.49 
After notice has been published, the EPA administrator “shall, 
after giving due consideration to a petition” take one of three actions.50 
The EPA must: “(i) issue a final regulation;” “(ii) issue a proposed 
regulation” under its own initiative coupled with the issuance of a final 
                                                 
44 Id. at 5. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. 
47 21 U.S.C. §§ 346a(d)(1)(A) and (B) (2012). 
48 §§ 346a(d)(2)(A)((i)-(xiii). 
49 § 346a(d)(3). 
50 § 346a(d)(4)(A)(emphasis added). 
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regulation; or “(iii) issue an order denying the petition.”51 Some petitions 
will qualify for expedited review under §346a(d)(4)(C).52 However, 
petitions that do not qualify for expedited review are sometimes forced to 
deal with the fact that the statutory language of §346a(d)(4) does not 
require administrative action within a set timeframe.53 
One study revealed that on average, the EPA takes approximately 
4.4 years to finalize its response to petitions, some taking as long as 
fourteen years to finalize.54 The EPA is undoubtedly aware of this issue 
with regards to some petitions.55 Additionally, the FFDCA does provide 
for “adversely affected” persons to obtain judicial review of petitions for 
“any regulation that is the subject of an order issued by the EPA."56 
Despite this, judicial review of petitions that do not require a statutory 
                                                 
51 § 346a(d)(4)(A)(i-iii). 
52 § 346a(d)(4)(C). 
53 § 346a(d)(4)(A). 
54 Hammond, supra note 3, at 337.  
55 Id.at 364 n. 150 (“As the Withdrawal Guidance notes, it is ‘important to maintain 
communications with petitioners regarding the status of a complex petition ... so that a 
petitioner does not erroneously conclude that EPA has unreasonably delayed action on its 
petition.’”). 
56 21 U.S.C. § 346a(h)(1) (2012). 
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deadline seldom prevail.57 Nonetheless, for petitioners seeking to compel 
agency action, an avenue for relief does exist.58  
B. Writ of Mandamus and the Administrative Procedure Act 
The All Writs Act (“AWA”) grants Federal Courts the authority to 
issue writs “necessary or appropriate . . . and agreeable to the usages and 
principles of law.”59 The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) provides 
that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or 
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a 
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”60 However, the 
APA does not provide the opportunity for persons to challenge every type 
of agency action.61 
One type of action (or more appropriately inaction) the Supreme 
Court interpreted falls within the APA is an agency’s “failure to act.”62 
Furthermore, §706(1) of the APA provides that “a reviewing court shall . . 
                                                 
57 Hammond, supra note 3, at 338. 
58 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012).  
59 28 U.S.C. § 165 (2012). 
60 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
61 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of "Not Now": When Agencies Defer 
Decisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 157, 168-69 (2014). 
62 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 68 (2004). 
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. compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”63 
Regardless, an agency’s failure to act must still fall within the purview of 
the APA in that it must be a “discrete agency action that it is required to 
take.”64 
In Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., the Court defined  the term 
“discrete” and “required” agency action.65 The Court listed several actions 
under the APA, including  “an agency statement of . . . taking of other 
action on the . . . petition of a person,” that constitute as discrete agency 
action.66 Although the Court did not find “failure to act” to fit the 
definition of a discrete action listed with the other actions, it did find 
“failure to act” to be “equivalent thereof” in that it specifically applies to 
“a failure to take one of the agency actions earlier defined.”67 Therefore, 
“a ‘failure to act’ is properly understood” to be a “discrete action.”68 
As to what action an agency is “required to take” the Court pointed 
out that §706(1) specifically requires actions be “unlawfully withheld.”69 
                                                 
63 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012). 
64 Norton, 542 U.S. at 64. 
65 Id. at 62.  
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 62-63.  
68 Id. at 63. 
69 Id. 
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The Court did not address §706(1) other aspect of  “unreasonable delay”; 
however, it did state that mandamus was typically limited to those actions 
“of a ‘precise, definite act . . . about which an official had no discretion 
whatever.”70 Ultimately the Court found that although it cannot direct the 
manner in which an agency may act, “when an agency is compelled by 
law to act . . . a court can compel [that] agency to act.”71 
 The Norton court failed to address “unreasonable delay” in 
§706(1).72 As Hammond & Markell noted, “there is a judicial reluctance 
to interfere with how an agency prioritizes its work; the absence of a legal 
standard to apply makes review difficult; and there is lack of an agency 
decision to help focus the court's review.”73 Still, agency discretion with 
regard to timeliness in response to petitions does face constraints.74 As the 
Norton court pointed out and to which Sunstein & Vermeule agree, if 
there is a clear statutory deadline, an agency must comply with that 
deadline.75 Another constraint that is often observed is the fact that 
agencies cannot “abdicate” those responsibilities tasked to them by 
                                                 
70 Id. (quoting U.S. ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 46 (1888)). 
71 Id. at 65. 
72 Id. at 62-65. 
73 Hammond, supra note 3, at 338. 
74 Sunstein, supra note 61, at 195. 
75 Id.; Norton, 542 U.S. at 62-65. 
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Congress.76 Lastly, there exists a general principle that agencies cannot try 
to circumvent their responsibility to respond with undue delay.77 For those 
responsibilities tasked to an agency using the term “shall” as opposed to 
“may”, the authorizing statute provides “a good indicator” the agency 
must respond in a timely manner.78 “Unreasonable delay” in the context 
lacking a clear statutory deadline has most frequently been addressed 
using a six factor assessment set forth in Telecommunications Research & 
Action Ctr. v. F.C.C. (“TRAC”).79 
C. The TRAC Factors 
TRAC was a 1984 case where a non-profit corporation along with 
public interest groups petitioned the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals for a 
writ of mandamus requiring the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”) to decide pending agency issues.80 Like other courts, the TRAC 
court found that §706(1) of the APA requires a court to compel agency 
action that is “unreasonably delayed.”81 Additionally, the court noted that 
                                                 
76 Sunstein, supra note 61, at 195. 
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Hammond, supra note 3, at 338. See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. F.C.C., 
750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
80 Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr., 750 F.2d at 70. 
81 Id. at 79. 
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§55(b) of the APA also “mandate[s] agencies decide matters in a 
reasonable time.82 Although the court ultimately found that because the 
FCC reinforced it was moving to resolve the issue in question, the court 
did not need to address the issue of unreasonable delay.83 Before issuing 
its holding, the court outlined what is now recognized as the six TRAC 
factors: 
(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be 
governed by a “rule of reason”; (2) where Congress has 
provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with 
which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling 
statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this 
rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the 
sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when 
human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should 
consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency 
activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court 
should also take into account the nature and extent of the 
interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not 
“find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in 
order to hold that agency action is ‘unreasonably delayed.’ 
”84 
 
                                                 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 80. 
84 See Beyond Pesticides/Nat'l Coal. Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Johnson, 407 F. 
Supp. 2d 38, 40 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr., 750 F.2d at 
79-80 (internal citations omitted)). 
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Beyond Pesticides/Nat'l Coal. Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. 
Johnson applied these factors.85 This 2005 case involved both parties, 
Beyond Pesticides and the EPA, seeking motions for summary judgment 
as to whether the EPA “unreasonably delayed” its response to Beyond 
Pesticides’ petitions to cancel or suspend three wood pesticides.86 Before 
applying the TRAC factors, the Beyond court cited Norton as the standard 
to which it would determine at what point the EPA came under a a legal 
duty to act so as to be able to measure the amount of delay in question.87 
Although, Beyond Pesticides argued the court should consider its 1997 
petition as the point in which the EPA was obligated to respond, the court 
determined that because Beyond Pesticides did not make a formal request 
to cancel or terminate the pesticides until 2001 the EPA was not obligated 
to act until December 2001.88  
The Beyond court addressed the first two TRAC factors 
concurrently.89 The court’s reasoning for this was that “congressional 
expectations or mandates” play a pivotal role in determining how fast the 
                                                 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 38-39. 
87 Id. at 39. 
88 Id. at 39-40. 
89 Id. at 40. 
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EPA should reasonably be expected to address the petition.90 These two 
factors weighed in favor of the EPA in this case because the court 
concluded that the EPA would issue a response to Beyond Pesticides 
petition and was already addressing the wood pesticides in a reregistration 
process required by statute.91 Also, the court noted that the EPA was under 
no statutory duty to respond to the petition within a certain timeframe.92 
All three of the next TRAC factors were found to relate to how the 
EPA prioritized the “action requested.”93 In the context of the EPA, the 
third factor was found to be minute because “virtually the entire EPA 
docket . . . involves issues” that deal with human health and welfare.94 
Thus, because the EPA is tasked with the responsibility of regulating 
issues that primarily deal with human health and welfare, and its docket 
reflects this, the court also found delay would be “irrelevant” because 
prioritizing one issue before another as Beyond Pesticides would have 
would usurp the EPA’s discretion and “produces no net gain.”95 
                                                 
90 Id. (citing In re Monroe Commc’n Corp., 840 F.2d 942, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
91 Id. 
92 Id.  
93 Id. 
94 Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
95 Id. at 40-41 (quoting In re Barr Labs, Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
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The EPA was found to have satisfied the sixth factor as well.96 
According to the court, there need not be any “bad faith” in order to find 
unreasonable delay, nonetheless the EPA was shown to have been 
exercising its discretion satisfactorily, evidenced by the fact that of the 662 
cases the 1988 amendments to FIFRA tasked the EPA to reregister,  229 
reassessments were complete and 152 had been initiated.97 Additionally, 
the court noted there is a “’well established presumption that public 
officials . . . act in good faith.’”98 
In granting summary judgment in favor of the EPA,99 the Beyond 
court did not contemplate the remedy of ordering the agency to set forth a 
schedule on how it plans to address the issue in question while retaining 
jurisdiction to ensure compliance.100  In retaining jurisdiction and 
requiring an agency to issue a schedule as to how and when it will address 
a petition, courts have successfully been able to balance Congress’ clear 
                                                 
96 Id. at 41. 
97 Id. at 40 (citing In re Barr Labs, Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
98 Id. at 41 (quoting Bayshore Res. Co., Inc. v. U.S., 2 Cl. Ct. 625, 632 n. 4 (1983)). 
99 Id. at 41. 
100 Carol R. Miaskoff, Judicial Review of Agency Delay and Inaction Under Section 
706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 635, 657 (1987). 
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intent that courts resolve issues of unreasonable delay under the APA101 
while still providing the agency with discretion as to how and when it will 
implement its mandated obligations.102  
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
The In re Pesticide Court began its analysis by finding that the 
standard with which the EPA is measured is set forth in the APA.103 The 
Court determined that if the EPA was withholding action “unlawfully” or 
with “unreasonabl[e] delay”104 it is within the authority of the Court to 
grant mandamus relief under 28 U.S.C. §1651.105 In order to determine 
whether the EPA had violated its statutory work standard, the Court relied 
on precedent in declaring that mandamus relief is appropriate only in the 
                                                 
101 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1966); see Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1187 (10th 
Cir. 1999); see also U.S. v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607 (1989) (by using “shall” in civil 
forfeiture statute, “Congress could not have chosen stronger words to express its intent 
that forfeiture be mandatory in cases where the statute applied”). 
102 Miaskoff, supra note 100, at 657. 
103 In re Pesticide Action Network N. Am., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 798 F.3d 809, 
813 (9th Cir. 2015); see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc. 435 U.S. 519, 521 (1978).  
104 Pesticide Action Network, 798 F.3d at 813 (quoting 5 U.S.C.  §§ 555(b), 706(1) 
(1966)).   
105 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1948) (“[A]ll courts established by Act of Congress may issue 
all writs necessary.”). 
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specific and unique circumstance when an “agency’s delay is 
egregious.”106  
The Court applied the “TRAC factors” test in shaping its 
determination.107 Although the Court found in favor of the EPA in its 
earlier assessment of the TRAC factors test, it was not influenced by the 
EPA’s argument in light of the current circumstances.108 The fourth factor 
pertaining to the EPA’s priority interests as an agency and the fifth factor 
regarding the interest of PANNA were addressed in the prior ruling and at 
that time fell in favor of the EPA because the Court was sympathetic to the 
EPA’s use of its resources and noted that in 2006 chlorpyrifos was 
certified as a safe pesticide.109 However, even more important according to 
the Court, the EPA’s establishment of a “concrete timeline” to which it 
was to adhere carried significant weight as it pertains to the “rule of 
reason” found in the first two factors.110 
                                                 
106 Pesticide Action Network, 798 F.3d at 813 (quoting In re Cal. Power Exch. Corp., 245 
F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas 
Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988). 
107 Pesticide Action Network, 798 F.3d at 914.  




The Court rejected these arguments put forth by the EPA this time 
around.111 In planning to issue a “proposed rulemaking” and not a final 
ruling, the EPA failed to provide the requisite certainty needed to 
successfully argue it did in fact have a “concrete timeline.”112 Also telling 
of the EPA’s position was the fact that it acknowledged there may not be a 
ruling at all depending on the outcome of settlements.113 Moreover, the 
EPA’s recent history of failing to adhere to its own timetable114 and the 
fact that the EPA has admitted chlorpyrifos may be harmful to farmers, yet 
has failed to initiate any proceedings to resolve the matter further, 
dissuaded the Court of the EPA’s arguments.115  
The Court’s analysis of the fifth factor, which focused on the 
EPA’s digression from its prior position that chlorpyrifos was safe, 
weighed heavily in determining that the interests prejudiced by further 
                                                 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id.  
114 Id. (“The D.C. Circuit's comment in Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Brock 
seems particularly apt here: ‘In light of the fact that [the agency's] timetable 
representations have suffered over the years from a persistent excess of optimism, we 
share petitioners' concerns as to the probable completion date.’” (quoting Public Citizen 
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delay outweighed the prejudice against the EPA.116 By issuing a change in 
the labeling of the pesticide and a report about the dangers to the water 
supply, the EPA’s own “assessment” of chlorypifiros provided the final 
piece the Court needed to evaluate whether agency action should be 
mandated.117  
The Court held that these factors necessitated granting Pesticide 
Action Network’s prayer for mandamus relief, and the Court ordered the 
EPA to issue a final ruling no later than October 31, 2015.118 
V. COMMENT 
 The United States regulatory system is vast and complex. Federal 
agencies are a key component that our system of government relies on 
when it comes to enforcing Congress’ laws. As time passes, this legal 
framework increases demands on these agencies in that more laws and 
regulations are passed and more laws and regulations must be enforced. 
What is more, these laws and regulations are seldom consistent over the 
course of several years. Legislators on both sides of the aisle prioritizing 
different issues will rely on the same federal agency for enforcement.  
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In a system of finite resources, agency inaction can ensue and the 
need for a court to compel agency action in the face of clear violation of 
the law is tantamount. Still, writs of mandamus in the context of agency 
decisions are extremely rare, and rightfully so.119 Congress authorizes and 
expects agencies to act, and when they do not, Congress has authorized 
and expects courts to uphold its intent.120 However, Congress also 
recognizes that agencies must have discretion on certain issues to best 
fulfill its intent, and the courts should uphold this intent as well.121 
For an agency such as the EPA, who not only regulates pesticides, 
but also such things as water quality, air quality, cosmetic safety, food 
safety, and a whole host of other effects on human health and welfare, the 
undertaking of implementing its own mandates and Congress’ mandates 
become enormous.122 In re Pesticides exploits the very issues that arise 
because of this type of vast legal framework. 
                                                 
119 See In re Cal. Power Exch. Corp., 245 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Pub. 
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One key aspect the In re Pesticides court failed to address was that 
in the case of chlorpyrifos, the EPA’s statutory deadlines for reregistration 
did provide a clear legal standard with which the court could have 
observed.123 In one regard, the EPA already completed a massive 
undertaking by reevaluating over 9,000 pesticides—including  
reregistering chlorpyrifos—according to the mandatory ten-year review 
required under the FQPA. What is more is that this review applied the new 
standard for chemical residue pesticides. The EPA discovered that it was 
not as beneficial and safe as previously thought, so it used its discretion 
accordingly; limiting those pesticides it found to be unsafe. Consequently, 
in meeting its statutory deadline to reassess chlorpyrifos by 2006, it 
fulfilled one of Congress’ statutory mandates. The next statutory deadline 
the EPA was required to meet did not come until 2011 under FIFRA’s 
fifteen-year review. Although the court pointed this out when it first 
addressed PANNA’s writ of mandamus request, it did not analyze the 
expectations of Congress when looking at the EPA’s deadlines.  
                                                 
123 See Beyond Pesticides/Nat'l Coal. Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Johnson, 407 F. 
Supp. 2d 38, 41 (D.D.C. 2005). 
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The fact that this particular proceeding had gone on for so many 
years is worthy of consideration, and the Court rightly does so.124 In 
pointing out that the EPA failed to adhere to its previously planned 
timeline, the court also addresses a concern that directly spurs from the 
EPA’s discretionary authority; federal agencies need to be predictable and 
accountable in exercising their discretion. But, was the EPA abusing its 
discretion with regards to failing to adhere to its own timelines? The court 
believed so, but its reasoning was based on the EPA’s actions, not 
Congress’ intent or expectations.  
In using the EPA’s own analysis that chlorpyrifos might not be as 
safe as it once thought, the court relies directly on the EPA’s discretionary 
authority, yet at the same time uses that exercise of discretion against 
them.125 The court’s reasoning here is questionable in that it does not 
distinguish the difference between the EPA’s discretion to classify 
chlorpyrifos as an unsafe pesticide, and the next step: EPA’s discretion as 
to how it will implement the necessary regulations to ensure the safety of 
human health and welfare. If the EPA’s discretionary authority is good 
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enough to classify a pesticide as unsafe, why is it not good enough with 
regards to its response to PANNA’s petition? One way the court could 
have addressed this would be to compare the EPA’s timetable to 
Congress’.126 
Courts have frequently acknowledged that statutory timelines are 
manifestations of Congress’ intent. In setting clear timelines for pesticide 
chemical residues, Congress provided one clear standard with which it 
intended chlorpyrifos to be evaluated. The court placed little to no 
emphasis on the fact that in exercising its discretion, the EPA’s intent to 
fulfill its obligations according to its 2009 work plan, a discretionary 
response to PANNA’s petition, directly aligned with Congress’ 
expectations for reevaluating chlorpyrifos starting in 2011. In setting 
timelines of ten and fifteen years, surely Congress was addressing the fact 
that these types of evaluations take enormous amounts of time, planning, 
and resources. Regardless, the court never addresses the EPA’s timeline in 
this manner.  
In granting third parties the right to petition the EPA, Congress 
created one avenue with which people could assert disproval of the EPA’s 
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actions. With any EPA decision, no matter the merits, there is always 
bound to be someone who opposes it. Consequently, there is a risk that 
petitions can be frivolous. That does not authorize the EPA to ignore these 
types of petitions, but in granting the EPA powerful discretionary 
authority, Congress was aware that this type of situation could occur and 
the EPA must take action accordingly.127 This is not to say that petitions 
are useless. Petitions are a valuable resource the EPA can and should 
utilize. Such benefits include spotting issues that the EPA might not 
otherwise address for clear lack of knowledge, as well as questions arising 
to decisions, regulation, or orders the EPA may have inappropriately 
addressed, i.e., when the EPA oversteps its bounds. Conversely, as 
PANNA argued, the EPA had not done enough with respect to 
chlorpyrifos.  
Although PANNA was dissatisfied with the EPA’s lack of action 
with respect to its petition, there were still actions taken. The EPA’s 
continued action during the course of the proceedings for In re Pesticides, 
including the 2012 limitation placed on chlorpyrifos, clearly illustrates not 
only that the EPA was exercising its discretion in devoting resources to 
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chlorpyrifos regulation, but also using its discretion to address PANNA’s 
petition, albeit in a roundabout way. However, the court seems to place 
little emphasis on these actions.128 
The EPA’s inability to keep its own discretionary timetable 
appears to be the deciding factor against its case.129 In using this factor, 
the court attempts to account for Congress’ intent to grant the EPA 
discretionary authority, without overstepping its bounds. The court 
justifies this by using the EPA’s analysis of chlorpyrifos as unsafe to 
conclude it was an imminent threat to human health and welfare worthy of 
more direct action. This is certainly reasonable, and the court’s decision 
may be right, but it might also fundamentally alter the way the EPA deals 
with petitions. Although we want predictability and accountability from 
our federal agencies, the concern is that an agency such as the EPA will 
always respond in a way that ensures they can comply with their timeline. 
This incentive could potentially lead to longer delays in responses to 
actions, the exact result the court is trying to avoid. 
  
                                                 




Human health and welfare is undoubtedly of utmost importance. 
Political candidates from all backgrounds and parties certainly can agree 
to this. But oftentimes that seems to be the only thing they agree upon. 
The EPA, as part of the executive branch of government, is often tasked 
with implementing these parties’ ideologies; the influence of politicians 
and special interest groups is clearly relevant. Even the EPA 
acknowledged it was in settlement talks with industry groups during the In 
re Pesticides litigation. Consequently, governmental changes lead to 
changes in priority as often as as the weather changes in Missouri, and 
often just as extreme. This type of priority shifting can and does 
significantly affect how the EPA decides to prioritize its obligations, 
potentially altering its approach as to how and when it takes action to 
certain petitions. If the EPA decides to respond to these petitions by 
overstating the timeline it actually needs for fear of court intervention, this 
will only exacerbate the problem. Yet, courts must be authorized to take 
action to compel agency inaction in clear violation of the law, but courts 
should be sure to thoroughly vet all the potential harms that result as a 
consequence.        SAMUEL STEELMAN 
